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Abstract 
Socio-economic inequalities are often studied at the country or local level, 
which offers insight into local dynamics and perceptions. This paper considers 
discourses of inequality within and between countries, enabling a consideration 
of the web of connections between places and ideas.  The three study countries 
are spread along a continuum with varying national wealth and diverse regional 
locations: Kenya, Mexico and the UK. This international comparative approach 
identifies some key discursive ways of supporting inequality that persist in 
diverse neoliberal settings. Specific discursive devices include the focus on 
personal aspirations, opportunities, denial of problems, discrediting alternatives 
and framing inequality as being natural.  
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Introduction 
Socio-economic inequality influences many details of how people’s lives are 
lived, and inequalities often overlap so that those who are less well-off 
financially generally tend to have lower status jobs, fewer years in education, 
worse health, and ultimately shorter lives.  This social gradient can be observed 
at global, national and sub-national levels.  The rationales and justifications for 
socio-economic inequalities at the local and national scales are quite well 
documented (Polet, 2007; Corbridge, 2004; Reis and Moore, 2005; White, 
2007; Plehwe and Mills, 2012).  Popular challenges by social movements to the 
injustices associated with inequality have been well documented, as have the 
‘global social dialogues’ of international institutions (Yeates, 2009; Chatterton & 
Gordon, 2004; Wright, 2008).  Less attention has been paid to how people 
without a specific interest in inequality make sense of the inequalities at the 
world level.  An exception is recent work on international perceptions of 
meritocracy (Duru-Bellat and Tenret, 2010; White, 2007).  I posit that an 
assemblage of particular understandings bolsters inequality, influencing 
personal politics, aspirations, and beliefs about what is desirable and even 
possible for society.   
 
Instead of investigating the views of activists, politicians, or business people, 
this paper considers the views of secondary school teachers in three neo-liberal 
countries that span a spectrum of wealth: Kenya, Mexico and the UK.  This 
selection of countries enabled me to access the arguments and logics 
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surrounding inequality from people who are positioned along a continuum of 
world inequality.  As agents act “with points of view, interests, and principles of 
vision determined by the position they occupy in the very world they intend to 
transform or preserve” (Bourdieu, 1996, p.2), and coming from different 
vantage points their perspectives on socio-economic inequality may differ.  Yet 
these same people are entangled within a neoliberal approach that considers 
“that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework 
characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade” 
(Harvey, 2005/2009, p.2). 
 
This paper identifies some facets of international understandings of the 
economy and society that have come to act as barriers to reducing economic 
inequality (after Fairclough, 2009). These discourses come from a varied group 
of teachers with their own class-based interests, but bear resemblance to the 
ideas of neoliberalism (see Mirowski and Plehwe, 2009). Other ideas and 
discourses that emerged in this research, but are not the focus of this paper, 
challenge current levels of inequality. Understandings of socio-economic 
inequality that may enable its persistence include perceiving the processes that 
lead to inequality as being desirable and natural; and seeing inequality as being 
vast and unstoppable.   
 
Literature: discourses of inequality and the spread of ideas 
Neoliberalism is accompanied by social values that justify and sustain its 
existence, and the foundational value of neoliberalism is individual freedom 
(Harvey, 2005/2009).  The idea of the individual is central to western 
philosophy, economics, politics and religion. Whilst not inherently problematic, 
individualism can be associated with loss of agency and solidarity when it 
becomes narcissistic and self-absorbed (Thake, 2008), so could exacerbate 
inequalities.  Other beliefs about how society works are also prone to framing 
inequality as desirable and unavoidable.  It is suggested that the majority in 
power in most rich countries believe that elitism is efficient, exclusion 
necessary, prejudice natural, greed good and despair inevitable (Dorling, 
2010b).  These tenets bolster the preferred moral story of rulers, “that we are 
decent folk trying to do our best” (Ignatieff, 1998, p.288). A materialist 
perspective can explain why more powerful members of society hold such 
views, yet these ideas are not confined to those at the top of the social 
hierarchy. 
 
Since the late 1970s the shift towards political and economic neoliberalism has 
seeped into general understandings, aiming to preserve the capitalist economy. 
Dominant classes persuade subordinate classes that their values embody the 
natural order (Gramsci in Jackson, 1989). Neoliberal thinkers have worked to 
bridge cultures, span countries, and engage the global South (Plehwe and 
Mills, 2012). The trope that ‘capitalism works’ whereas socialism has been 
‘demonstrated’ not to work is a dominant view (Levitas, 2007, p.300). Shifts 
towards neoliberal policies tend to take the form of apparently technical 
adjustments, and are justified as being economically rational choices rather 
than by ideological arguments about a preferred system (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1999; Ferguson, 1990). As such, market principles rather than 
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welfare ideals often determine resource distribution (Smith and Easterlow, 
2004). My own theoretical perspective is critical of the impact that inequality 
has both on societies and individuals, and draws on neo-Marxist and post-
Marxist approaches.  
 
The concepts of neoliberal globalisation need passeurs (carriers) to transport 
these logics, values, and modes of organisation (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 
1999), and it is to these transporters of the “common sense” of the period that 
I now turn. The strict loan conditions of the International Monetary Fund since 
the 1980s have brought neoliberalism to many countries including Argentina, 
Mozambique and the Philippines, often enriching the wealthy at the expense of 
the poorer majority (Chatterton and Gordon, 2004; Harvey, 2005/2009). 
Conservative think tanks and University of Chicago economists have played a 
role in naturalising and spreading neoliberal thought since 1979 (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1999; Harvey, 2005/2009), at a time when Deng Xiaoping made 
steps towards liberalizing the Chinese market in 1978, Margaret Thatcher 
became British Prime Minister in 1979, and in 1980 Ronald Regan became 
President of the United States. Another set of passeurs are the media and 
education, with their great potential to educate and motivate the public 
(Rosenblatt, 1996; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1999). 
 
Inequalities embodied in hierarchies often appear natural when there is close 
“correspondence between the social order and the principles of its 
arrangement” (Bourdieu, 1972/2009, p.164). System justification theory 
proposes that people are, often sub-consciously, motivated to support the 
status quo through resisting change (Jost et al., 2004). Coping strategies to 
make injustice more bearable similarly defend inequalities through 
categorisations such as the lazy poor and the industrious rich (Bamfield and 
Horton, 2009). Forms of concealment of ideas and concepts surround most 
social practices. These include isolation (practices are separated from wider 
society and historical context); conflation (practices are not differentiated); 
eternalisation (practice appears unending rather than historically bounded); 
emphasising natural causes (obscures the social causes); overlooking 
interrelations between practices; and hiding conflicts of interest between 
differently positioned subjects (Urry, 1981). Karl Marx considered that the 
concealment enacted by ideology not only hides one’s own interests from 
oneself as false consciousness, but also hides one group’s interests from 
others thus representing ruling class interests as those of the whole society 
(Marx in Jackson, 1989). Focusing on three capitalist countries, this paper 
identifies neoliberal discourses that bolster economic inequality.  
 
Methodology 
Discussion groups suit the aims of this research, because they involve semi-
public discussion of inequalities, thereby accessing the social nature of 
knowledge (Goss & Leinbach, 1996). I conducted 9 discussion groups in 
Kenya, 8 in Mexico and 7 in the UK. Group sizes ranged from 2 to 8 people. 
School teacher participants were mostly recruited at their school and already 
knew one another. The discussion groups were one-off meetings and lasted for 
roughly 90 minutes. To maximise diversity teachers included trainee teachers 
to retirees; those working in towns, cities and rural areas; those teaching richer 
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and poorer students; and included state and private schools.  In discussions 
teachers referred to many sites of inequality, ranging in scale from the home 
and school, to comparing countries and continents. Seven topics were 
addressed: what inequality means; participants’ awareness of world 
inequalities; what causes inequality; the importance of inequality as a world 
issue; visualizations of world inequality were used as material for discussion; 
positive and negative aspects of inequality; and frequency of discussions about 
inequality (for Discussion Guide see text box, for a more detailed methodology 
see Barford, 2010). The discussion groups in Mexico took place in Spanish, 
those in the UK and Kenya were conducted in English.  
 
 
Discussion guide 
Introduction: 
1. Welcome and thank participants. Hand out informed consent forms. 
2. Explain topic is how teachers in diverse place think about world inequality. 
3. Give information about PhD thesis & publications. Note that data are made 
anonymous, by removing people’s and schools’ names. Explain the audio 
recording and ask if this is OK. 
4. Suggest guidelines for discussion: I ask questions followed by discussion. 
There is no order for speaking, but just one person speaks at a time. Note 
that it will take roughly 1 hour, and check if anyone has to leave early. 
5. Invite questions before we start. Collect consent forms; offer refreshments. 
OPENING: Ask name and the place they were born. 
INEQUALITY: What does the word ‘inequality’ mean to you? 
SCALE: Now I would like to ask more about inequality at the world scale. How 
aware are you of this in your daily life? 
CAUSES: In your opinion, why do some people have few opportunities, 
whereas others have many? Is inequality inevitable? 
IMPORTANCE: How important an issue is inequality, compared to other issues 
like global warming and terrorism? 
MAPS: I would like you to tell me what you think works, or doesn’t work about 
these images. How useful are they in learning about inequality? 
GOODS, BADS: What are the good things and bad things about inequality? 
CONVERSATION: How often do you talk about these issues, with your friends, 
family or colleagues? 
Text box: Discussion Guide 
 
 
Analysis evaluated how interviewees positioned themselves and others, what 
words allow the speaker to do, and how topics are prioritized (Wood & Kroger, 
2000).  Using emic themes arising from the data made less expected findings 
possible (Goss & Leinbach, 1996). I identified several discursive repertoiresi 
about the value and necessity of inequality (Jackson, 2001).  Comparing within 
and between countries highlights absences and presences of ideas, 
experiences and approaches. The findings presented here are not 
generalisable to the research countries because of the comparatively small size 
and participants not being selected in order to be representative. These findings 
are best understood as illustrations of some of the wider understandings of 
socio-economic inequalities. Note that interruptions of main speaker are shown 
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in square brackets. 
 
 
Findings and discussion 
Below I present themes that emerged in discussions about inequality. These 
are at times contradictory and open to critique, yet give insight into 
understandings and values on the topic of inequality.  
 
Aspirations  
Some participants claim that inequality motivates. Inequality, they say, 
encourages healthy competition and struggle, and promotes development. 
According to some Kenyan participants this increases productivity, improves 
the quality of products, encourages hard work, leads to good quality services, 
altogether making Kenyans “pull our socks up” and move ahead. Similarly in 
Mexico, several participants argued that inequalities motivate, create 
competition and set challenges, resulting in hard work. In the UK inequality is 
reported to make us do things, to drive growth, and urges us to develop which 
some teachers described as being “obviously good” (UK 7, rural private school); 
overall stimulating a desire to better oneself. In all three countries the benefits 
of inequality were acknowledged as being work, competition and progress. The 
motivating mechanism is identified as observing others’ success, which 
generates a desire to “catch up” or even “move ahead”. The possibility to dream 
is highlighted as an advantage of inequality: “it gives you an opportunity to 
dream, to aspire and to work towards.” (Kenya 7, British-system private school). 
In the UK Conservative, Liberal Democrat, and New Labour political parties 
have argued that some inequality is essential to encourage aspiration (Sheldon 
et al., 2009).  
 
When teachers spoke about their own lives they were often aspirational, talking 
hopefully about the future. This aspiration took the form of making comparisons 
up the social hierarchy, demonstrating that their sights were set on upward 
social mobility. Aspirations were at times explained self-consciously and 
critically; several Mexican groups suggested that acting self-interestedly 
reproduces inequalities. The saying “first me, then me, and afterwards me” 
arose several times, in a conscious critique of this mentality. Nevertheless this 
“me, me, me” mentality was exhibited within those same groups.  
 
“If you have purchasing power, you buy the best. You take the finest, it’s 
a status symbol, social status. If you have you’re in one social class, if you 
don’t have then you’re in another social class. If you have less you, you 
will be classified by your [accumulation of goods] accumulation of goods. 
And ultimately you will be unhappy because you are always trying to be 
something that you can’t be. You start to want to have a car, holidays, [a 
house] houses. What happens when poor people have credit cards? We 
buy more [than we can afford] than we can afford, then [then we have 
problems paying,] with problems, exactly. Why, because you want to 
create the fantasy that you have! You wanted to go to next social level. 
And when you wake up and find that no, on the contrary, that you haven’t 
got a higher status you, you are affected by it because you’re in debt.” 
(Mexico 6, rural government school) 
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In the passage above the speaker gains certainty when he says that one will 
be unhappy because of always wanting what one cannot have. His certainty 
suggests that he felt strongly about that possibly well-rehearsed point. His 
speech slows when giving examples of what people want, and becomes more 
eloquent when referring to the fantasy of ownership. That status symbols are 
important is explained by the Mexican proverbs: you’re worth what you have 
and you’re treated according to your appearance. This emphasis on 
appearance and possessions explains wanting the best, to reflect being the 
best. Unfortunately desire for material goods often conceals the often 
exploitative conditions of production (Howarth, 2000). 
 
Aspiring to lifestyles higher up the social hierarchy was seen as detrimental to 
pupils, the obliging subjects of some of teachers’ social commentaries. Parental 
wealth can be a source of easy money for young people, winning them respect 
and role model status (see quotation below). Parading wealth to which others 
aspire reinforces the illusion that the wealthy can have more and more, 
irrespective of the impact this has beyond their lives (Creegan, 2008).  
 
“You see young people, teenagers, driving these big cars from their 
parents. They have no idea why they came about, and so, they become 
like role models, people adore them and they wish they were like so and 
so, and some of them may be so dense in school so it makes kids feel 
‘why worry?’ I mean you don’t have to work too hard in school, I mean if 
your parents are rich they’ll give you a big car. And, and, it’s something 
that people adore. Or wish they could have.” 
(British-system fee-paying school, Kenya) 
 
Amongst British teachers, being relatively rich compared to other participants, 
explicit ambition was replaced by complacency: “I’m a smug overweight bastard 
like anyone else you know. I have a pretty good life ... inequalities are fine by 
me.” (Urban retired teachers, UK). This participant had previously discussed 
his concern about inequalities, but argues that he benefits from being high up 
the hierarchy; a contradiction also acknowledged in the title ‘If you’re an 
egalitarian, how come you’re so rich?’ (Cohen, 2001). Still, affluence comes 
with its own psychologically damaging impacts (James, 2007). 
 
Instead of aspiring to improve their social position, UK participants placed a 
greater emphasis on consuming in an individualistic manner. In one group of 
urban trainee teachers a participant said that despite knowing cheap clothes 
are probably produced in sweatshop conditions, he likes buying nice clothes 
that are cheap. This attitude reflects the nested form of Western responsibility, 
termed a Russian doll geography, where caring for home first, then place, then 
nation is acceptable (Massey, 2004). A difficulty in thinking about the ethics of 
caring is that it is not clear to whom or where our obligations lie (Robinson, 
1999). As found by other researchers, the UK groups bought into consumerism 
and distanced themselves from negative consequences of inequality (Thake, 
2008). Kenyan and Mexican groups spoke of aspirations whereas UK groups, 
who are very rich in world terms and quite rich in UK terms, spoke of consuming 
whilst often avoiding talking about its effects.  
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Focus on opportunity 
Several groups from each country defined inequality partly as inequality of 
opportunity. An opportunity is “a time, condition, or set of circumstances 
permitting or favourable to a particular action or purpose.” (Oxford English 
Dictionary, 2009). The opportunities of greatest interest to participants were 
jobs, education and access to money, all indicators of success; a lack of 
opportunity means conditions that are not conducive to attaining these. It might 
be that equality of opportunity is ‘more apparent than realʼ (Marmot, 2004/2005, 
p.257), as opportunity is the possibility rather than the outcome. Aspirations 
also influence what is seen as opportunity. The success of a minority may be 
interpreted to mean that everyone has that opportunity, which shifts the onus 
onto individuals to exploit that. 
 
Lack of opportunity rather than structural inequality was often identified as 
being problematic. Teachers in a Kenyan British-system private school linked 
poverty to lack of opportunity by positing the latter as the main problem and 
describing how rich parents pay for their children to go to university even when 
they fail their exams. Establishing this connection between wealth and 
opportunity provides a blame-free way of explaining oneself: “I have not had 
the opportunity to travel much” (Mexican urban government school) presents 
opportunity as an external limitation on behaviour, rather than something that 
individuals can create. ‘Limited opportunity’ appears to be a euphemism for 
poverty borrowed from a discourse of rights and stripped of its critical edge. 
 
A spatial dimension to opportunity was highlighted: in my discussion groups 
Kenyans spoke about the greater opportunities in the UK (compared with 
Kenya), and Mexicans about opportunities in Canada (compared with Mexico) 
and the city (compared with the countryside). “Mexico has very clearly marked 
inequalities. In other countries there is more equity and more opportunities, not 
in Mexico” (Mexican urban government school). Migration for opportunities is 
significant for Mexican society and there is a view that things are better in the 
United States. Speaking in terms of migrating ‘for opportunities’ rather than 
simply ‘for work’ sounds aspirational, aspirations being esteemed. Opportunity 
thus means capability to meet basic needs; this even applies to access to water: 
“There are not the same opportunities in the countryside as in cities, there are 
extreme examples when people don’t have water.” (Mexican urban teachers). 
The double meaning of opportunity, basic needs on one hand and desires for 
wealth on the other, creates the misconception that these wants are 
comparable and that aspiring is the solution to both. 
 
The success of someone from a humble background is a trope implying 
widespread opportunity. This myth is politically conservative, as it requires no 
major changes. Rags to riches narratives support the view that success reflects 
individual merit, but of course overlooks the educational and social advantages 
of children from better off families (Devine, 2004; Toynbee and Walker, 
2008/2009). The successes of a few poor people can be misinterpreted as 
meaning that any failure is personal rather than societal, overlooking the 
demands of capitalism for a flexible, low-paid workforce. The wealthy people 
who are seen as most deserving are those who rose from humble origins and 
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succeeded by their own merit (Bamfield and Horton, 2009): 
 
“A mentality could be a reason as to why we have poverty. Especially in 
Kenya. Or in Kibera where I’ve lived for almost 20 years of my life. Er, 
there is one person, a great industrialist today, he is called Chris Kirubi, 
although a little bit proud, one day he was saying ‘I myself, Chris Kirubi, 
does not wear second hand clothes’, the other day he was quoted as 
saying he can take a jet to the UK, you know, do his studies there. After 3 
days he comes back to Kenya. But he is damn rich, he is rich. But Chris 
Kirubi grew up in the slum. He is one of the kids who had nothing at all. 
He was also an orphan, but he was totally poor. He came from a very very 
humble background. But I don’t think he had that kind of mentality which 
I, he did not, I stick to the fact that, and he did not stick to that mentality 
towards ‘I don’t have’, ‘I’m not going to have’ yeah, he grew out of that 
mentality. That slum mentality and poverty mentality. And today we can 
see where he is, he can fly to UK and back any time.” 
 (Kenyan NGO-supported slum primary school) 
 
The quotation above suggests that with the right mentality you can escape 
poverty. What is missing is that Chris Kirubi is an exception; 1 billion slum 
dwellers (Davis, 2006/2007) testify to rags to riches not being the norm. Yet 
personal optimism combined with a desire to believe that things will get better, 
makes the success of those with such a modest starting point appear, at least 
initially, particularly inspiring. Yet equating opportunity with freedom for social 
mobility resonates with values of personal freedom. Neoliberalism is able to 
exploit desire for freedom whilst overlooking social justice (Harvey, 2005/2009). 
Rags-to-riches stories subtly position those who remains poor as responsible 
for ‘their’ poverty. 
 
Talk of opportunity and mobility is part of the new global vulgate (la nouvelle 
vulgate planétaire) of globalisation, flexibility and identity, whilst overlooking 
capitalism, exploitation and domination (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2000/2002). 
Focusing on opportunities highlights procedural equality, avoiding questions of 
outcome or justice (Rowlingson, 2010). Yet even social mobility is greater in 
more equal countries (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). However it is the 
appearance of and belief in the possibility of mobility that encourages public 
acceptance of a focus on opportunities and the placing of responsibility for 
success on the individual. The myth of meritocracy presents career and 
financial success as reflections of ability and effort rather than an advantageous 
starting point. Participants thus construct themselves as being active within the 
system but unable to change the wider social structure. 
 
Denial 
The myth of the happy poor promotes the idea that inequality is not as bad as 
it seems, and presenting oneself as average (i.e. not rich) seems to excuse 
responsibility for inequality. These arguments are particularly attractive 
because people dislike feeling guilty about living comfortably (Toynbee and 
Walker, 2008/2009) and denying that inequality is problematic frees people to 
continue as they are. Marshall Sahlins suggests that hunter-gatherer societies, 
conventionally assumed by anthropologists to have bourgeois impulses limited 
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by their paleolithic tools (i.e. desires for luxury material goods but without the 
means of getting these), are misjudged as being poor; they balance needs and 
material goods by possessing only what they can carry (Sahlins, 1972). 
Nevertheless, when intersecting with modern societies hunter-gathering people 
find themselves in politically and economically weak positions (Suzman, 2004), 
wanting more and lacking more (Sahlins, 1972). The myth of the happy poor 
reduces guilt, necessarily overlooking the politically and economically weak 
positions of poor people within modern society. 
 
“In Chiapas there are people who are happy with $2 per day.”  
(Mexican urban teachers from different schools) 
 
“Who are we to say to people who live on one dollar a day, it’s probably 
very hard for me to say this because I’ve never lived on one dollar a day, 
but some people might just be genuinely happy with that, they’ve got 
enough for them to stay healthy and, ok, maybe that’s very extreme, but 
you know who are we to say ‘POOR THEM’” 
(British urban trainee teachers) 
 
The happy poor are constructed as being geographically and socially distant, 
either abroad or rural, which allows them to be imagined as having different 
needs from the research participants. The Mexican quote above refers to the 
district of Chiapas that is relatively poor and home to many indigenous people. 
That the people of Chiapas are happy with $2 a day is based on their needs 
being different from those of the speaker. A similar comment from Kenyan 
urban trainee teachers suggested that $2 is too much in the countryside. 
Amongst a group of British urban trainee teachers the idea of the happy poor 
took the form of a warning against patronizing pity, as though pity and apathy 
were the only possible responses to poverty. Again there is no discussion of 
the possibility of social change.  
 
Part of the thinking that the poor are happy comes as an inversion of the often-
challenged idea that wealth brings happiness. This false opposition ignores the 
mental stress caused by lack of material means. Elevating happiness to the 
position of the arbiter of right and wrong diminishes the importance of justice. If 
the poor were all happy, if everyone were happy, would gross differences in life 
chances be acceptable? Moving the discussion away from the moral and the 
material, happiness can depoliticise the debate. Happiness can also be 
deceptive because bearing adversity cheerfully does not mean there is no 
adversity (Sen, 2010). 
 
Denying one’s wealth avoids responsibility for inequality, because whilst the 
rich are sometimes blamed for their greed and the poor for their laziness or low 
aspirations, there is greater silence surrounding the middle classes who are 
nevertheless aspiring, consuming, and sustaining unequal values. People 
generally perceive themselves to be average (Bamfield and Horton, 2009), and 
even city high-flyers, amongst the top 0.1% of UK earners, denied they were 
rich when asked (Toynbee and Walker, 2008/2009). Positioning oneself as 
average or below average is a way of excusing oneself of responsibility 
according to existing explanations of inequality. At a British rural private school 
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one teacher derided another for being posh and shopping at a high-end British 
supermarket. One Mexican group commented: “you can see inequality when 
driving, and soon a ‘Hummer’ stops beside your modest car.” This variation on 
working class pride contrasts with the aspirations to grandeur expressed 
elsewhere. When several reference groups are invoked people can 
simultaneously occupy positions of relative wealth and relative poverty. For 
example, Mexico is typically contrasted with the United States, not Guatemala: 
 
“And I saw lots of contrasts with Mexico, it is very clean, well ordered, very 
educated, a 1st world country. And in Mexico, like they say, well it’s 
another thing. This is an inequality.” (said forcefully) 
(urban government school, Mexico) 
 
Mexico, a powerful and wealthy state in many respects, was portrayed as the 
antithesis of the cleanliness and order of the United States, which is particularly 
poignant because many Mexicans who take cleaning jobs in the USA.  
 
Discrediting alternatives 
The conviction that there are no alternatives is an effective justification for 
continuing as we are, because we have no choice. The no alternatives 
argument juxtaposes capitalism with “communism, which didn’t work”, which 
generally concluded this topic of discussion. Saying “communism didn’t work” 
implies that capitalism is working, and it implies that there are only two options 
in this binary political thinking which overlooks the many other possible ways in 
which societies and communities can be structured; this echoes Margaret 
Thatcher’s claim that “there is no alternative” (Thatcher, 1980; Watts, 2007; 
Harvey, 2005/2009). The argument that communism did not work, so cannot 
work, frames the discussion in extremes.  It implies that capitalism is working 
without actually saying the word capitalism, a word that is more commonly 
employed in critiques of inequality. The implicit contrasting of capitalism and 
communism means talk about our existing social organization occurs without 
naming it. Not naming something makes it harder to identify and challenge. 
Instead an alternative form of social organization is specified as being 
unsuitable.  
 
Discursively destroying the ideal of equality, by associating communism and 
equality, is another way of abolishing alternatives. The argument that greater 
equality would not work rests partly on the conflation of equality and sameness, 
where being identical is deemed a necessary but undesirable aspect of 
equality. This reasoning is also based on a deep-seated belief that we should 
be differently remunerated, which makes equality unimaginable. 
 
“There’s no way ... people will be equal.  
Facilitator: no?  
It’s not going to be.  
Facilitator: never?  
They cannot be equal. It’s just some semblance and having to accept 
some certain things and you push on with life and you are just going to 
say that we are going to be equal, nobody’s going to accept.” 
(high-achieving urban government school, UK) 
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The flat denial of the possibility of equality, or even moving a little nearer to 
equality, above shows how strongly the idea of greater equality can be rejected, 
on one’s own and others’ behalf. Perhaps this group had become cynical over 
time having observed unpleasant politics, concluding that the best thing was to 
accept the status quo in the Kenyan context where critical voices, such as that 
of author Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o, are strongly discouraged. Abolishing alternatives 
allows inequalities to persist, avoiding social thinking and critique by focusing 
inwards on oneself. The use of unqualified phrases such as “no way”, “cannot”, 
“nobody” presents a world of no alternatives to inequality and no desire for 
alternatives. 
 
The idea of ‘working’ or functioning contributes to this series of dualisms: 
capitalism works, communism does not. Yet there is little discussion of what it 
means for something to work or for whom it works. A Kenyan urban trainee 
teacher said of Tanzanian socialism, “Socialism in Tanzania was abhorred and 
was deemed to have failed. Why? Because socialism was not on the right side 
of the politics of the day”, but the resultant strong Tanzanian identity as opposed 
to the conflict and tribalism in Kenya now benefits Tanzania. Gandhi’s ideas 
were also deemed to not work by one British teacher: 
 
“I don’t know whether Gandhi would agree with you there, but there you 
are 
I’m sure he wouldn’t! 
He wanted everybody to make their own clothes. And wear a bed sheet 
(scoffs) 
Yeah but the world would not work if Gandhi ruled it [Yeah.] Well maybe. 
Dunno”  
(urban fee-paying girls school, UK) 
 
Gandhi’s thinking is undermined by mocking his views as backwards and 
likening his clothing to a bed sheet, which makes him seem silly. The idea that 
the world would not work under Gandhi demonstrates how the statement that 
something will not work discourages further discussion. It also illustrates how a 
partial understanding can still undermine alternatives: Gandhi did not want to 
‘rule’, the concept of Swaraj expressed a preference for self-governance at the 
village level (Gandhi, 2005). Although another participant considered that 
Gandhi’s philosophy could work, the discussion did not contemplate what ends 
we are working towards. The conversational demolishing of alternatives to 
inequality can discourage discussion about social change and possible utopias. 
 
“Yeah, yeah, I mean I don’t know how everyone can be, can go and find 
that amount of money and be wealthy, I suppose everyone can’t be poor 
as well, but it’s not shared. Um, but I don’t know if you could share it or 
not, I don’t know how it would work. I suppose that would seem unfair 
perhaps to people who have earned their money, and then it gets shared 
out more. And then there are people who haven’t earned their money but 
they probably haven’t had the circumstances to earn it. It’s quite 
complicated. [laughter]” 
(urban trainee teachers, UK) 
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The trainee teacher above seems to be considering for the first time whether it 
would be possible to share wealth more equally. Whilst there exist many 
possible ways to redistribute wealth such as taxes, income caps, and smaller 
income differences, these were absent from his discussion. Concern about 
whether sharing could work centred on whether it would be acceptable to upset 
the rich. Again the suggestion that this is all very complicated closes down 
discussion on this topic, rather than opening debate to resolve the complication. 
Stopping short of a solution without examining other possibilities reinforces the 
impression of there being no alternatives. Chatterton and Pickerill (2010) argue 
that finding alternatives is often messy as opposed to being a coherent single 
argument, thus the requirement for a coherent alternative is asking for more 
than is needed. 
 
Seeing inequality as natural 
Identifying the ‘natural’ as causing trends and events obscures the social 
causes, and eternalisation makes a social practice seem timeless rather than 
temporally bounded (Urry, 1981). Both increase the impression of inevitability. 
Naturalisation of inequality takes two tacks: one is that human nature is to be 
unequal and the other is that natural resources are unevenly distributed which 
makes us unequal. This is backed up by concealment through eternalisation: 
“inequality has been a process forever, since pre-history” (Mexico urban middle 
class government school) which reiterates naturalness by showing persistence 
and inertia. Inequality is presented as widespread and deeply ingrained, 
forming “the basis of all our institutions” (UK retired urban teachers). Concepts 
of innate behaviour and preference for looking after a small group of other 
people, your family, justified selfishness, competitiveness, and inequality in 
terms of human nature: 
 
“I’ve got a little boy who is three, just thinking about things like 
Christmas, I’m, you know, quite happy to go into somewhere like 
‘toysRus’ and spend 100 pounds on a toy for him. But when I’m going to 
buy a present to go to a party for someone else’s child, then it’s like a 
maximum 20 pounds. And so it’s just a natural response to, you know, 
it’s ok if it’s going to be in MY house, for MY son [evolutionary drive, 
yeah] yeah” 
(rural fee-paying school, UK) 
 
Using natural instinct to explain the buying of expensive toys, not part of a 
natural state, transposes desires to secure basic needs to consumer spending. 
This behaviour is more easily justified by human nature than it would be by 
socialization. However the naturalness of inequality is challenged when the 
character of early humans is interrogated. In the eighteenth century Jean-
Jacques Rousseau argued that inequality is created and sustained by human 
society and did not exist amongst people in nature (Rousseau, 1754/2004). A 
similar thesis argues that during prehistoric times mobile hunting groups were 
egalitarian, due to weaker group members joining forces to dominate the strong 
(Boehm, 1999). The naturalness of inequality seems to be more a feature of 
contemporary ideology than historical and pre-historical reality. 
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Resource distribution and acts of God were identified as extra-human causes 
of inequality. Only in Kenya were acts of God identified as causes of inequality, 
causes that are too large to struggle against. Note that some Mexican groups 
mentioned discrimination within their local Catholic Church. Uneven resource 
distribution was mentioned as an act of God and in a secular explanation of the 
naturalness of inequalities. However, inequality is something humans can 
consciously alter and attributing it to nature denies people’s agency. The 
following examples show how human actions influence resource access, which 
is an important aspect of resource distribution. Oil-rich Nigeria has a very large 
poor population due to lack of distribution of resources (Achebe, 1983/1984); 
famines do not simply result from crop failure but from economic relations, such 
as the British still taking food from Ireland during the potato famine of 1845-52. 
HIV/AIDS was also considered to be a purely natural problem (Kenyan rural 
Catholic girls boarding school). Whilst acknowledging physical differences, it is 
time to “banish the bogeyman of geographical determinism” (Sachs, 2005, 
p.58) from our understandings of inequality. 
 
“As much as it exists and it is very much with us, and you can’t do away 
with inequality, and a good example is in the forests, a very natural 
environment, a very natural forest, you have those big trees that are able 
to grow up and get sunshine and carry out photosynthesis, and you have 
the small trees that will have to coil around it, so that they have to 
depend on the big trees for the sunlight for them to, so we can’t be 
equal.” 
(high-achieving urban government school, Kenya) 
 
This analogy compares society to an ecosystem, promoting ideas of equilibrium 
with each person performing a role that complements others. Naturalness is 
emphasised through repetition of “very natural”. The big trees correspond to 
the big men, or powerful people, whose success is attributed to their ability to 
grow or take opportunities, reminiscent of Margaret Thatcher’s reference to ‘tall 
poppies’ who were encouraged to do the same. The dependence of “smaller 
people” upon the big men refers to tribal and family responsibilities to help the 
others. This is persuasive because in imagining the structure of a forest, society 
is simplified and its functionality is highlighted. An imaginative leap is needed 
to compare society to a forest, after which all that is said about the forest applies 
directly to society. The forest is described in positive terms of trees reaching up 
for sunlight to photosynthesise. Note how using a scientific concept adds 
credibility, yet there is no further explanation of the similarities between the 
forest and society. 
 
The human nature argument attributes selfishness to survival situations, 
despite sharing often promoting survival. Identifying natural forces positions 
people as being passive and moved by human nature, natural distributions and 
natural diseases. The supposed naturalness of inequality comes with 
reluctance for change: “So we may not be able to change, it would be hard to 
change completely” (Kenyan rural government school). In fact, inequality is 
entirely manageable, as evidenced by differing levels of equality between 
countries. People are socialised into certain preferences, but just because it is 
what we individually have always known does not mean it is natural. Presenting 
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inequality as natural bolsters inequality as it can be hard to challenge “the 
irresistible authority of a law of Nature” (Marx, 1872, p.10 of Chp.14). This 
authority stems from nature being presented as a powerful and unalterable 
force; if something is natural we can renounce responsibility for it. Naturalising 
gives a sense of security embedded in a logic of nature. 
 
Conclusion  
The above arguments support and defend inequality along neoliberal lines, 
acting to justify existing economic and political arrangements. Similar 
discourses were exhibited between countries, and the techniques of isolation, 
eternalisation, naturalization and hiding conflicts of interest are modes of 
concealment that render social practices ideological (Urry, 1981, p.60- 61). The 
particular conjunctions in which these values were expressed varied: Kenyans 
use the UK as a comparator whereas Mexicans cite the United States. When 
speaking of the happy poor, British participants referred beyond national 
boundaries whereas Mexican and Kenyan participants more often spoke about 
their compatriots. Whilst the “grammar” expresses similar logic, the 
“vocabulary” is context-specific. 
 
The adoption of aspects of this neoliberal logic by people in all three countries 
shows how effective it is and the barrier to social change that it presents. Above 
are some possible responses from three continents to the question: “Why not 
make things better? It is in all our interests.” (Marmot, 2004/2005, p.266). The 
responses, like the Marmot review, could be more aspirational for society as a 
whole (Marmot et al., 2010; Pickett and Dorling, 2010). I have shown a 
widespread aspiration to improve oneʼs own lot, concern with social mobility 
rather than social change, and optimism for the future that discourages talk of 
change. That inequality is presented as unproblematic, “not my responsibility”, 
the only viable option, and created by natural forces, also blocks talk about 
change. 
 
The discourses presented here exist alongside less conservative approaches. 
Framing debates about inequality in terms of the social and health outcomes, 
extending human rights to include socio-economic rights, and thinking in terms 
of social justice (Pogge, 2008; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009), enables other 
discussions about inequality. This might include seeing inequality as a problem, 
clarifying the major causes, and understanding inequalities to be avoidable and 
manageable. Identifying these discourses can help us to question how they 
justify economic inequalities. Specifying the ways in which neoliberal logic 
becomes common sense enables its critique. 
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2001, p.206-7). Peter Jackson notes that groups and individuals relate 
differently to these discursive repetoires and do not necessarily agree with a 
whole discourse just because they agree with one part of it (Jackson, 2001, 
p.206-8). 
 
